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Abstract—The rapidly developing Web environment provides
users with a wide set of rich services as varied and complex as
desktop applications. Those services are collectively referred to
as “Web 2.0”, with examples such as Google Docs, Flickr, or
Wordpress, that allow users to create, manage and share their
content online. By switching from desktop applications to their
cloud-based Web equivalents more and more data is released
online. It is the user who creates data, who disseminates it and
who shares it with other users and services.
Storing and sharing resources on the Web poses new security
challenges. Access control, in particular, is currently poorly
addressed in such an environment and is not well suited to
the increasing amount of resources that are available online.
We propose a new approach to access control for the Web.
Our approach puts a user in full control of access to their
resources which may be scattered across multiple cloud-based
Web applications. Unlike existing authorization systems, it relies
on a user’s centrally located security requirements for these
resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Access control (authorization) protects resources against
unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized or improper mod-
ifications. In desktop systems users are in full control over
their resources. Not only do they host resources within their
own domain of control but they typically use a single access
control mechanism to protect these resources. Similarly, closed
environments, such as those built on the Windows Active Di-
rectory (AD) technology or internally deployed Web systems
widely used within enterprises, allow to achieve a comparable
functionality.
In contrast to desktop systems and enterprise settings, the
Web is highly distributed with its parts being under control
of different authorities. Data is no longer stored in a single
location but is rather distributed and hosted by each Web
application separately. These Web applications have their own
access control mechanisms which are often tightly bound
to the application and have limited flexibility in terms of
their configuration or adaptation to particular user’s security
requirements [19].
As the Web environment has been changing constantly, it
has become exceedingly user-centric and user-driven. It has
This work is supported by UK Technology Strategy Board grant nr. P0007E
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recently adopted a user-centric identity model where authenti-
cation is delegated to third party Identity Providers (IdP) using
such protocols as OpenID [10] or Shibboleth [6]. However, the
Web still lacks a comparable access control solution based on
concepts analogous to OpenID. Such mechanism would allow
users to choose their preferred access control components and
use their functionality for various Web applications [17]. This
paper presents such a solution.
The recently investigated User-Managed Access (UMA)
protocol [7], first proposed as ProtectServe in [16] and de-
fined in [15], discusses a user-centric design for managing
access to Web resources. It provides a method for users to
control third-party application access to their protected Web
resources residing on any number of host sites. UMA has been
researched by the User-Managed Access Work Group (UMA
WG) [27] virtually in parallel with our work on access control
solutions for the Web. Therefore, we describe its similarities
and differences to our system.
In this paper we present a solution to a user-controlled
access management to resources on the Web. Our approach
consists of an architecture of services, each with a well-defined
role, and an access control protocol that specifies interactions
between these services. It puts a user in full control of access to
their resources and relies on a user’s centrally located security
requirements for these resources. Such security requirements
are expressed in a form of access control policies and are
stored and evaluated in a specialized component.
The paper is organized as following. We present a simple
scenario of sharing resources on the Web in Section II. We
discuss problems of controlling access to Web resources based
on the scenario in Section III. We provide a requirements
analysis for a user-managed access control solution in Section
IV. In Section V, we present our proposal of such user-
managed access control that addresses the identified problems
and satisfies formulated requirements. Section VI contains
an overview of the prototype implementation of our system.
We discuss progress and future work in Section VII. We
examine related work in Section VIII. We finally draw some
conclusions in Section IX.
II. SCENARIO
Before describing the problem of existing access control
solutions for the Web environment we will investigate a
simple scenario of a Web user who creates, hosts and shares
information using various Web applications with other users
and services on the Web. We will define this scenario based
on the already identified scenarios as discussed in great detail
in [23].
Let’s assume that a Web user has access to a popular online
gallery service to host photos, an online video service to host
video clips and a Web-based word processor to create and host
various documents. We shall call the Web user Bob and we
will refer to the online services as WebPics, WebVideos, and
WebDocs respectively.
Bob, as a hobbyist photographer and a frequent traveler,
uses the above mentioned Web applications to document his
numerous trips to exotic countries. He uploads photos and
videos and creates documents to describe adventures that he
has experienced. He organizes his photos into albums, videos
into collections and documents into folders using WebPics,
WebVideos and WebDocs respectively. All the content that he
creates or uploads to these Web applications is exposed as Web
resources. However, it is made private by default and cannot
be accessed by other users of the Web.
The collection of photos increases with every trip that Bob
goes on and he decides to share some of them with his
friends Alice and Chris. Therefore, Bob logs in to WebPics and
composes access control policies which would reflect these
sharing requirements. These composed policies are later en-
forced by internal access control mechanisms of the WebPics
application. When Bob decides to additionally share his videos
and trip reports with Alice and Chris, he composes policies at
WebVideos and WebDocs applications analogously.
Photos, videos and trip reports are well appreciated by
Alice and Chris and over time other friends of Bob wish
to have access to them. Thus, every time Bob decides to
share these albums, collections or folders with an additional
person, he logs in to all three applications and changes access
control policies accordingly. On the other hand, when Bob
decides to share more of his content with the same group of
people, he then defines new access control policies at each
Web application and applies these policies to relevant Web
resources.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To identify shortcomings in existing access control solutions
for the Web environment, we conduct an analysis of the
scenario as described in the previous section. We present our
evaluation of the possible weaknesses that we observe:
1) Access control is currently tightly bound to each Web
application limiting its configuration or adaptation to a
particular user’s security requirements and expectations.
Typically, access control is only able to address rela-
tively simple scenarios where data is either made public
or accessible only by a predefined set of users of the
application.
Bob, for example, is only able to use the mechanisms as
provided by WebPics, WebVideos and WebDocs which
may not necessarily meet all his security requirements.
If Bob decides to create groups of users for the sake
of simplicity when defining access control rules for his
resources, none of his Web applications may support
that. Surprisingly, such simple access control related
functionality is missing in most popular Web applica-
tions with sharing capabilities. A Web application which
does not support a particular security feature may be
abandoned by some of its users.
Existing frameworks that allow to externalize access
control from Web applications may mitigate the problem
of missing security features in Web applications. These
frameworks, however, are ill-suited for the open and
highly-user driven Web environment and we discuss
their shortcomings in Section VIII.
2) Access control policies are composed using possibly dif-
ferent and incompatible policy languages. WebPics may
use a simple access control matrix while WebVideos
or WebDocs may use a more flexible policy language.
Differences in policy specification are highly probable
on the Web where applications are under control of
different authorities.
Diverse policy languages used by disparate Web appli-
cations may not be considered as a problem at first.
However, if we examine an example where Bob decides
to move some of his resources from one Web application
to another, then the problem of discrepancy of such
languages is much more visible. In such a case, Bob may
not be able to reuse the already defined access control
policies and may be challenged with composing these
policies again.
Moreover, when a user is forced to define access control
policies using different and incompatible policy lan-
guages then it is not possible to easily apply the same
policy to protect resources hosted by a different Web
applications. In our scenario, Bob is unable to define
access control rules only once and apply these rules to
photos, video clips and documents which are hosted at
different applications.
3) Composing access control policies is performed with
the use of custom management tools available at each
Web application. This results in an inconsistent User
Experience (UX). In the considered scenario, Bob has
to familiarize himself with interfaces of security tools
at all three Web applications that we consider if he
wants to share resources efficiently and securely. These
interfaces and their capabilities may differ significantly
from one another with some of them being more usable
than others.
At present, it is more likely that Bob would choose his
preferred Web applications based on their implemented
functionality than based on their security properties. For
example, Bob may choose an online gallery service
which is fast, allows its users to edit their photos and
create personalized photo albums and has a user-friendly
interface. It is possible, however, that security conscious
users may decide to abandon such functionally rich
applications in favor of those which provide more ad-
vanced security features. Additionally, this leaves Web
application developers with a challenging task when
designing and implementing security mechanisms for
their Web applications which need to be tailored to
requirements of the application’s target user group.
4) With heterogeneity and distribution of access control
policies, a user lacks a consolidated view of the ap-
plied security controls over their resources. Introducing
new access control policies, modifying existing ones,
and auditing them is a challenging task and requires
traversing Web applications that host resources to which
such policies should apply.
In our scenario, Bob does not have a holistic view over
the applied access control rules for his photos, videos
and documents at WebPics, WebVideos and WebDocs
applications respectively. With the increasing amount
of resources that Bob may store on the Web, it is
possible that he may incorrectly link resources with
access control policies. This may result in resources
being either exposed to invalid users or not accessible
to the valid ones.
Moreover, auditing access requests to protected re-
sources requires pulling such information from all in-
volved Web applications. A user has a limited ability to
correlate access requests to resources hosted by different
applications. Bob, for example, is required to visit each
Web application if he wants to audit how photos, videos,
or documents are being accessed by his friends.
Based on the analysis of our scenario, we identify the
following fundamental shortcomings in existing access control
solutions for the Web environment. These shortcomings have
either not yet been addressed or have been addressed only
partially by proposals for access control systems for the open
Web environment:
(S1) Access control lacks sophistication since it is a side
issue for typical Web 2.0 applications.
(S2) User needs to use many diverse and possibly incom-
patible policy languages.
(S3) User needs to use many diverse and bespoke policy
management tools with diversified User Experience.
(S4) User lacks a consolidated view of the applied access
control policies across multiple Web applications.
The aim of our work is to address the above mentioned
shortcomings in the existing access control solutions for the
highly collaborative and distributed ”Web 2.0” environment.
IV. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
On the basis of the identified shortcomings we formulate
a set of core requirements for a user-managed access control
solution. We deliberately focus on high-level requirements and
omit technical details which are out of scope of this paper.
(R1) A user should have a choice to use the access
control mechanism which satisfies his exact needs
and requirements within user’s Web applications.
(R2) A user should be able to compose access control poli-
cies for distributed Web resources in their preferred
policy language.
(R3) A user should be able to compose such policies with
a single policy management tool that would provide
a consistent User Experience.
(R4) A consolidated view of the applied security controls
should be provided to support users with managing
access to the ever-growing number of resources on
the Web.
The above mentioned requirements address previously de-
scribed shortcomings, i.e. requirement R1 addresses the short-
coming S1 and so forth.
In the next section, we present our access control solution
for the Web which aims at satisfying these requirements. We
propose a novel architecture and an access control delegation
protocol. Our work provides benefits for both Web users and
Web application developers. Users can choose their preferred
authorization components that would be responsible for access
control to resources hosted by Web applications. Developers,
on the other hand, are relieved of the burden of building
access control functionality into their applications and can only
delegate access control to such specialized components.
V. APPROACH
We propose a novel User-Managed Access Control1 system
for the Web environment that is able to address all of the
previously identified shortcomings in existing authorization
solutions. Our proposal puts a user in full control of access to
their resources and relies on a user’s centrally located security
requirements for these resources. It satisfies the requirements
as identified in Section IV.
Our solution consists of an architecture of services, each
with a well-defined role, and an access control protocol that
specifies interactions between these services. We discuss the
architecture and examine our protocol in subsequent sections.
We then present advantages of our approach and provide an
overview of possible extensions to our proposal.
A. Architecture
We distinguish four actors within our system as depicted in
Fig. 1. Because the aim of our work, similarly to that of the
UMA WG [27], is to provide users with the mechanisms to
centrally control access to resources scattered across the Web,
we have adopted the terminology accepted by this work group
instead of the terminology that we used previously for these
actors in our architecture [22].
Our proposal is built on the concept of centrally expressed
user’s security requirements that are applied to a user’s
distributed Web resources. Such security requirements are
expressed in the form of access control policies and are stored
and evaluated in a specialized component. We refer to this
component as the Authorization Manager (AM).
1We have changed the previously used name of User-Centric Access
Control to User-Managed Access Control in order to better reflect the nature
of our system with users being in control over access to their Web resources.
Fig. 1. User-managed access control to resources on the Web.
With reference to Fig. 1, a User stores a resource at a Web
application (1). We refer to this application as the Host. A User
then delegates access control functionality from a single or
multiple Hosts to an Authorization Manager. A User may use
AM to define access control policies to protect a resource (2)
and grant access to a particular client, called the Requester, to
have access to this resource (3). A Requester can issue access
requests to a protected resource (4). Such access requests
need to be authorized by AM (5). Therefore, the entire access
control logic is performed by AM which decides whether a
particular access request is valid or not. AM issues access
control decisions which must be enforced by a Host (6).
1) User: A User is an entity that creates or uploads re-
sources that are later stored in Hosts and shares these resources
with Requesters. It is also a User who composes access control
policies using an Authorization Manager and associates these
policies with resources as necessary.
In order to delegate access control from Hosts, a User es-
tablishes a trust relationship between these Hosts and a User’s
preferred Authorization Manager. In such a relationship, the
communication between a Host and an Authorization Manager
is secure. The integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of
messages between components is preserved.
2) Authorization Manager: An Authorization Manager al-
lows a User to define access control policies for their online
resources in a uniform way irrespective of the Web application
that hosts those resources. This component makes access con-
trol decisions based on these policies. It provides functionality
of a policy administration point (PAP) and a policy decision
point (PDP), such as those specified in [9]. An AM also acts as
a token service that, following evaluation of access requests,
issues authorization tokens to Requesters.
In our proposal a particular Authorization Manager is cho-
sen and can be controlled by a User. We base our concept
on that used in OpenID where a user chooses their preferred
Identity Provider (IdP) according to their requirements and
preferences and the trustworthiness of an IdP. We envisage,
that a User would choose their preferred AM based on
available policy languages, policy editors, management tools
and AM’s overall UX. Additionally, more security conscious
users may decide to build their own Authorization Managers to
protect resources at Hosts. We refer to [23] for further discus-
sion on user motivations towards choosing AM components.
Access control functionality of an Authorization Manager
is used by a User’s chosen set of Hosts which delegate
authorization to AM and are only concerned with enforcing
access control decisions. These decisions are issued by AM
based on evaluation of access requests against applicable
policies.
3) Host: A Host can be any Web application that allows
Users to create or upload and then share data with other users
or services on the Web. An access control functionality of such
an application is delegated to AM. Therefore, a Host is only
concerned with access control enforcement of decisions that
are issued by AM. As such, a Host acts as a policy enforcement
point (PEP) [9].
Before a Host can offload its access control to a User’s
preferred Authorization Manager, a User must establish a
trust relationship between these two components as already
discussed.
Depending on the Host’s configuration, access control can
be delegated to AM either for the entire application, for
individual Users only or for individual resources. In a typical
setting, it is likely that each User will choose their preferred
AM for access control for all of their resources stored in
a particular Host. Our proposal, however, gives Users the
possibility to delegate access control for different resources
to different AMs as well [23].
4) Requester: A Requester is an application that is capable
of issuing access requests to resources on Hosts which are
protected by an Authorization Manager. A Requester is able
to obtain the necessary authorization token from AM. Such
token is later presented to the Host. Depending on the validity
of the token, a Requester may need to obtain it only once and
can use it for multiple subsequent access requests.
A Requester can be any Web application that accesses
resources stored in a different Web application that acts as a
Host. An example would be an online photo editing software
accessing a photo hosted on an online gallery. A Requester
can be also a Web browser controlled by a person who wishes
to access a particular resource stored in a Host.
B. Protocol
A high-level view of the protocol for interactions between
all parties of our proposed system is depicted in Fig. 2. It
consists of the following steps: (1) Delegating Access Control,
(2) Composing Policies, (3) Obtaining Authorization Token,
(4) Accessing Protected Resource, (5) Obtaining Authoriza-
tion Decision. Moreover, we discuss the protocol flow for
Subsequent Access Requests (6). We explain each phase of
the protocol in more details in subsequent sections.
The flow presented in Fig. 2 deliberately does not include
the authentication process between the parties of our system
and we assume that this process can be completed with
existing technologies. For example a User could authenticate
to a Host using OpenID or Google Account credentials.
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Fig. 2. High-level overview of the access control protocol.
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Fig. 3. A User establishes a trust relationship between a Host and AM.
1) Delegating Access Control: During the initialization
phase, a User establishes a trust relationship between a Host
and an Authorization Manager as depicted in Fig. 3. A User
achieves that by providing a URL of a preferred AM at the
Host’s side. A User is then redirected from the Host to AM to
confirm that this particular Host can delegate its access control
functionality to this component.
In such a relationship, the communication between a Host
and an Authorization Manager is secure in terms of the
integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of messages. It is
achieved using an access token that is generated by AM and
obtained by a Host.
When a relationship between a Host and AM is success-
fully created, a User is redirected back to the Host to be
acknowledged that a secure communication channel has been
established between. At this point, a User can protect resources
stored in a Host using the configured AM.
2) Composing Policies: A User interacts with the Web
application (Host) as usual and manages resources accordingly
to the interface provided. The way access control is exposed
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Fig. 4. A User associates an access control policy with a resource.
to the end-user depends on the application but is typically
achieved by providing a configuration menu of some sort. Such
menu is often accessible by clicking on a security-related link
associated with a resource (e.g. ”Share Photo”).
In case a Host delegates its access control functionality to
AM, however, a User does not access the configuration menu
but is redirected to this AM. It is when a User can link a
particular resource or a group of resources with an already
existing policy or a User can define new access control rules
as necessary. The flow of this part of the protocol is depicted
in Fig. 4.
3) Obtaining Authorization Token: In order to be able
to access a particular resource, which is protected by AM,
a Requester has issue an access request accompanied by
an authorization token. This authorization token refers to a
particular resource or a group of resources (realm) and a
particular Requester. It is issued by an Authorization Manager
that protects this realm and must therefore be obtained from
this component.
When a Requester issues an access request to a protected
resource for the first time, no authorization token is attached
to such request. Therefore, a Host redirects a Requester to the
AM along with information about the Host and the resource
this Requester tries to access.
The AM checks the access request and uses the information
contained in the request to find the applicable policies. It
then evaluates this access request against these policies. It
also issues an authorization token that is bound to the access
request and cannot be used to access other resources protected
by this particular AM.
When passing the authorization token to a Requester, the
AM redirects such Requester back to the Host.
Our previous proposal, as discussed in [22], was based
on the access control pull model that did not require an
authorization token and was transparent for the Requester. We
have introduced the additional step of obtaining such a token
based on the OAuth WRAP proposal [3] which we discuss in
Section VIII. Similar approach is also adopted by the UMA
protocol [7]. However, in UMA a Requester does not obtain
a token from AM but rather establishes an authorization state
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Fig. 5. A Requester obtains an authorization token from AM.
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Fig. 6. A Requester issues an access request with an authorization token.
for a particular realm at a particular Host. This state is then
checked by a Host when it queries AM for an access control
decision.
4) Accessing Protected Resource: When passing the autho-
rization token to a Requester, the AM redirects such Requester
back to the Host. As such, a second attempt to access a
resource is made. At that time, however, such request is
already accompanied with an authorization token (Fig. 6).
When a Requester successfully obtains an authorization
token and is redirected by AM back to the Host then a
Host validates the request and detects the token issued by
an Authorization Manager. The Host then checks whether an
access control decision has been already obtained from AM
for this Requester to access this particular resource. If not,
an access control decision query is sent to the Authorization
Manager.
5) Obtaining Authorization Decision: In this step of the
protocol, a Host sends an access control decision query to
AM (Fig. 6). This query is sent only if such decision has not
yet been issued by AM or if such decision is not cached at a
Host. Whether decisions are cached or not is implementation
specific. The AM may provide a User with mechanisms to
control caching of access control decisions.
A decision query contains information about the realm to
which an access request is performed, information about the
Host and the authorization token that has been provided by
the Requester.
An Authorization Manager evaluates this access control
decision query against applicable access control policies. How
this evaluation is performed is independent of the protocol
itself. We discuss possible approaches further in this section
and in Section VII.
After the policy evaluation process, an AM replies to a Host
with an access control decision response. The decision can be
either ”permit” or ”deny”. If the decision is ”permit” then
access to a resource is granted. A Host may choose to cache
access control decisions issued by AM.
6) Subsequent Access Requests: Once a Requester obtains
an authorization token and a Host caches an access control
decision then each subsequent request to a resource does not
have to follow the entire protocol and can be greatly simplified.
Such request can be simply evaluated by a Host which enforces
the cached decision. As such, a Host does not have to issue an
access control decision query to an Authorization Manager.
C. Advantages
Our access control solution for the Web environment has
numerous advantages over existing systems. In particular, it
addresses all of the identified shortcomings in existing access
control systems and discussed in Section III and meets the
requirements formulated in Section IV.
1) Access control functionality is externalized from Web
applications and provided in a form of a service. Its
configuration capabilities depend on the Authorization
Manager used by a User and do not depend on the actual
Web application. Therefore, a User can possibly decide
to use the AM that meets their particular needs and is
able to address sharing use cases required by a User.
This characteristic of our system meets requirement R1.
2) A user of our system can compose access control poli-
cies using a single policy language that is supported by
a user’s preferred AM. As such, a User is able to easily
define and apply a single policy to various resources
hosted at multiple Web applications. (R2)
3) Security policies can be composed using a single man-
agement tool at an Authorization Manager which allows
a User to have a consistent UX when managing these
policies. (R3)
4) With policies being composed using a single policy
language and hosted in a single location, users have
a holistic view of the applied security for their Web
resources. A User can introduce new access control
policies, modify existing ones, and audit them in a
single location. Moreover, access requests to resources
at different Hosts are evaluated centrally by AM and a
User may easily audit these requests and correlate them
without the need to pull logging information from all
Hosts. (R4)
We envisage that a User will choose their preferred AM
based not only on its functionality but on the UX provided by
this AM. We believe that with our approach, different sets of
users will be able to benefit from the functionality provided
by a particular Web application and will be able to choose the
AM which fits precisely to their needs.
D. Extensions
In the current setting, a User is the same entity that stores
resources in Hosts and which defines access control policies
for these resource. However, we envisage that a User may
only be concerned with managing resources and a different
entity, a Custodian, may be responsible for composing access
control policies for a User’s Web resources. We have identified
a scenario where such a setting is desirable and we discuss it
in great detail in [23] and [8].
Our proposal allows a user to delegate access control from a
set of Hosts to an Authorization Manager. In the most common
configuration, a single user would choose to have a single AM
to manage access to resources at all of a User’s Hosts. We
recognize different settings which may require multiple AMs
for different Hosts, for different resources hosted by a single
Host or for the same set of resources within one or more Hosts.
We refer to [23] for a discussion about possible configurations.
Typically, all access control decisions are issued by an
Authorization Manager and a User is not involved in the
decision making process. However, we have identified settings
in which a User may need to provide a real-time consent to
AM before the decision is made. In such situations, an AM
may send a request for such consent by sending an e-mail or
SMS message to a User and will not issue an authorization
token to the Requester before such consent is received. This,
however, requires the interaction between a Requester and
an Authorization Manager to be asynchronous. We plan to
adjust our proposal to satisfy this requirement similarly to the
solution adopted by the UMA protocol [7].
Depending on the provided functionality of a particular AM,
policies can be arbitrarily complex and may take into account
other factors than only identities and their access rights or the
previously discussed real-time user consent. Access control
is centralized and Hosts are only concerned with enforcing
decisions issued by AM. Therefore, such AM can make its
outcome dependent on such factors as a payment confirmation
obtained from a Requester. For example, a User would be able
use to a popular online gallery service to sell photos even if
such service did not provide such functionality initially. We
discuss this issue in more detail in Section VII.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a simple prototype of an Authoriza-
tion Manager which allows users to compose access control
policies and apply them to a set of resources hosted by differ-
ent Web applications. The AM provides both Web-based and
RESTful interfaces and supports creating, updating, deleting
and reading policies which are persisted in a datastore. A Web-
based interface can be used by a user of an AM to manage
policies. Additionally, these policies can be exported from and
imported into the datastore via a RESTful interface in JSON
or XML formats.
Our current implementation allows users to create a set of
general policies from which a single policy can be applied
to a resource or a group of resources. In addition, a resource
or a group of resources can be linked to a specific access
control policy. For example, a user may compose a general
policy which defines that all resources should be readable only
and a specific policy that ”write” operation is permitted on a
particular subset of these resources.
Evaluating access requests against access control policies is
currently performed by our custom-built policy engine and the
resulting decision can be either ”permit” or ”deny”. First, the
engine evaluates the access request against the general policy
as defined by a user for the group of resources to which a
particular resource belongs. If the decision derived from the
general policy is ”deny” then no other policy is processed.
In case the evaluation produces a ”permit” decision then the
engine checks whether a specific policy is associated with a
resource. It then evaluates the access request against this policy
and produces a final decision.
We have also implemented two prototype Hosts - an online
storage service and an online photo gallery. The first one is
an online file system accessible over a Web browser where
users can upload arbitrary files and create an arbitrary directory
structure. The second application allows users to upload photos
and create photo albums. Additionally, it allows users to edit
their photos (resize, rotate, crop, etc.). Thus, this application
also acts as a Web-based photo editing tool.
Both Hosts have a built-in access control functionality
allowing users to define access rights to their resources. Users,
however, can configure both applications to delegate access
control to our prototype Authorization Manager. Users can
then compose policies at the AM side. These policies can be
applied to resources hosted at any or both of our prototype
Web applications.
Access requests to protected resources can be issued using
existing Web browsers. Moreover, both our implemented Web
applications can act as Requesters as well. The online photo
album can access photos hosted at the online storage service
depending on access control policies that are defined for these
photos. As such, users can store photos in their online storage
service and can load them to the photo gallery. They can
then edit these photos as necessary. Analogically, the storage
service can access photos hosted at the online gallery. For
example, it may act as a backup service for online photo
albums.
All our prototype software has been implemented in Java
and can be deployed to the Google App Engine (GAE)
platform [1]. All applications make use of the rich set of APIs
provided by the platform to achieve the described functional-
ity.
VII. PROGRESS AND FUTURE WORK
We have defined an architecture of services and a protocol
for delegating access control functionality from Web applica-
tions to a specialized component. We have also successfully
implemented our proposed access control solution in Java.
Our prototype can be deployed to a popular cloud-based
application platform.
In our proposal, users are able to delegate access control
functionality from their Web applications to a centralized
component - Authorization Manager. The AM allows users
to create access control policies and apply them to resources
hosted at these Web applications. As such, it constitutes a
central point of control for access management over users’
distributed Web resources.
At present, our system relies solely on the access control
policies hosted and evaluated by AM. We plan to extend
our access control model and allow users to define terms
that must be met by Requesters in order to get access to
protected resources. A Requester would need to accept the
terms by providing necessary claims that can be evaluated
by the AM. For example, a User could require a payment
confirmation from a Requester before access to a resource is
granted. Similar approach is supported by the UMA protocol
[7].
Secure communication between a Host and AM is cur-
rently achieved using an access token that is generated by
AM and received by a Host. We plan to reuse the OAuth
access token negotiation [12] for this step. Moreover, a Host
at present refers a Requester to AM using redirection. We
investigate the use of XRD [14] and LRDD-based discovery
[11] where a Requester learns the location of the correct AM
and orchestrates the flow of the protocol. Both the OAuth
access token negotiation and XRD/LRDD based discovery is
currently adopted by the UMA protocol [7].
At present, our Authorization Manager uses simple access
control policies persisted within the GAE datastore. The AM
evaluates access requests against those policies using our
custom-built policy engine. We investigate the use of other
policy languages and engines. Preferably, we aim to test
applicability of XACML [9] and the RT framework [21].
We plan to use our experience in building Host applications
to develop plugins suitable for adoption by existing Web
applications as well. As a first instance, our goal is to approach
one of the popular online gallery software packages. We aim
to build a general library that could be easily reused by other
cloud-based applications.
Additionally, we evaluate existing proposals for access
control solutions and examine their strengths and weaknesses.
Our purpose is to further study the sharing habits of Web users
and use the findings of such studies together with experience
gained in other proposals to identify new requirements for a
successful solution to user-managed access control for Web
resources.
We also collaborate closely with the User-Managed Access
Work Group and we plan to contribute our experience to the
group and make use of its findings in our own design of the
protocol and the system itself. Ideally, we plan to make the
prototype of our own software UMA-compliant, and hence
interoperable with future UMA implementations.
We also plan to reuse our findings in the Student-Managed
Access to Online Resources (SMART) project [24] funded
by JISC. We plan to build an UMA-compliant access control
solution, deploy it within Newcastle University and evaluate
it through limited scale user studies.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Externalizing access control from Web applications is a
well known concept and is usually provided in the form of
frameworks, with examples such as ESAPI from OWASP [5]
or the OpenSSO system from Sun [4]. These allow developers
to call high-level APIs within the application’s code in order to
authorize requests and they allow definition of access control
policies within separate configuration files (or in a central
location as in OpenSSO).
Both solutions, however, have not been primarily designed
for the open Web environment. ESAPI provides benefits to
Web application developers only to alleviate the burden of
implementing security-related functionality. OpenSSO, on the
other hand, is advantageous for enterprise settings only with
a well-defined point of authority. Despite providing support
for both internal and external Web applications, it is not well-
suited for individual Web users but rather organizations with
custodians responsible for defining access control policies.
OAuth [12] allows a Web user, referred to as Resources
Owner, to share resources hosted by one Web application to be
accessed by another Web application. These Web applications
are called the Server and the Client respectively. Access to
such resources needs to be authorized by a the Resources
Owner who does not have to reveal any credentials to the
Client. Instead of that, the Client has to obtain an Access
Token which is used to access a resource.
OAuth requires a person to be present when authorizing an
access request. Access control policies are hosted at multiple
Servers. Despite the fact that OAuth supports secure sharing
of data between multiple Web services, it does not solve the
specific problem of access management to Web resources as
identified in Section III. A specific version of the protocol
proposed in [13] partially addresses these problems.
The User-Managed Access is an access control delegation
protocol for Web services [7]. It provides a method for users
to control third-party application access to their protected
Web resources residing on any number of host sites. This is
achieved by using a centralized authorization manager that
makes access decisions based on user instructions expressed
in a form of access control policies and terms. The protocol
is in the process of being standardized by the User-Managed
Access Work Group [27] 2 to address the identified scenarios
[8].
We perceive the UMA protocol as closely related to our
proposal of user-managed access control solution for resources
on the Web. Therefore, parts within our protocol have been
influenced by UMA and we have leveraged its findings during
our own design. In particular, we have included a push
sequence model to our protocol similar to that in UMA.
2Author Maciej Machulak is a voting member of the User-Managed Access
Work Group from its early beginning and has been a Use Case Editor and an
Implementation Coordinator for the UMA protocol.
However, in our case a Requester obtains an authorization
token that is later presented to a Host while UMA is based
on the concept of an authorization state. We envisage that
our protocol will integrate with that researched by the UMA
WG in due course with additional properties as entailed by
discussed requirements.
Similarly to our proposal, the OAuth Web Resource Autho-
rization Profile (WRAP) [3] allows for externalizing access
control functionality from Web applications to one or more
components called Authorization Servers. An Authorization
Server issues Access Tokens to Client applications which
must present this token when requesting access to a Protected
Resource. In OAuth WRAP there is no direct communication
between the application hosting resources and the Authoriza-
tion Server. It is the hosting application that makes an access
control decision based on the provided token.
Lockr [26] is an access control system based on social
relationships that separates content delivery and sharing from
managing social networking information. Users are able to
maintain a single social network and base their Access Control
Lists for different applications on social relationships. Lockr
focuses on social relationships only. It does not define a
generic model of authorization that can be utilized by vari-
ous Web applications and provide arbitrarily complex access
control for heterogeneous and distributed Web resources.
The Menagerie system [18] facilitates organization and
sharing of collections of Web service objects. Such hetero-
geneous Web services expose access operations through a
well-defined API and can be mounted into a local file system
namespace. Access control is based on a ”hybrid capability-
based protection system” where resource requesters must
possess an access token and can be subject to authentication.
Menagerie, however, restricts access to Web resources through
its Menagerie File System component.
In [25], authors describe an access control solution that
allows users to share content securely using existing secret-link
mechanisms. This solution is based on two main components.
The first one, called OpenIDemail, allows users to log in
to Web applications using their email. The latter one, called
the OpenPolicy Provider, allows users to define email-based
access control policies for resources. This component sends
the location (secret-link) of the resource to each valid email
address. It also evaluates resource clients against composed
policies. We perceive the proposed authorization system as
tightly coupled with the authentication process. Therefore, it
may not address various sharing scenarios and satisfy the
requirements as defined in Section IV.
A secure file system service for Web applications [20] sepa-
rates user data and Web applications. Files can be stored either
locally or remotely and can be accessed by Web applications
using the system’s client component which is integrated with
each application within the user’s Web browser. Access control
is based on capabilities which a particular application must
obtain in order to access a file. Because the proposed approach
requires user’s data to be separated from Web applications, it
entails significant changes in the existing approach to building
Web applications which rely heavily on having access to such
data. In the current model where resources are distributed
among various Web applications, this proposal does not appear
to solve the problem of user-managed access to Web resources.
Grouper [2] allows schools, departments or individuals to
control group management for resources hosted by various sys-
tems within their Higher Education (HE) institution. Combined
with a federated identity management such as Shibboleth, it
constitutes an important building block of an Identity and
Access Management (IAM) solution for the HE environment.
However, Grouper requires an institutional Identity Manage-
ment system and builds on standards with limited adoption
on the Web. Therefore, it is not envisaged to be additionally
used by services outside HE institutions. This may prevent it
from being deployed if such services are outsourced by an
institution or if services inside and outside HE institutions are
combined.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a novel access control
system for Web applications which fits precisely into the
highly collaborative and distributed ”Web 2.0” environment.
In our system users retain the ability to easily create and
share content using various Web applications and are addition-
ally empowered to flexibly control access to their increasing
amount of resources stored ”in the cloud”. Security and
privacy requirements are expressed as access control policies
which can be composed in preferred policy languages using
preferred policy management tools. Such policies are managed
at a specialized component (Authorization Manager) and are
applied to a distributed set of Web resources. A user can easily
manage permissions to data irrespective of Web applications
that host this data and have a consolidated view of the applied
security controls.
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